Electronically Filed
10/24/2018 11:23 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 46097
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
) Ada County Case No.
) CR01-2017-51545
v.
)
MICHAEL AARON BONNER,
)
)
Defendant-Respondent.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE PETER G. BARTON
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................................1
Nature Of The Case .................................................................................................1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................................1
ISSUES ................................................................................................................................3
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4
I.

II.

Bonner Showed No Privacy Right Infringed Upon
By His Detention..........................................................................................4
A.

Introduction ......................................................................................4

B.

Standard Of Review .........................................................................4

C.

The District Court Erred By Applying An
Incorrect Legal Standard ..................................................................4

Officer Linn Had Reasonable Suspicion To Detain
Bonner ..........................................................................................................7
A.

Introduction ......................................................................................7

B.

Standard Of Review .........................................................................8

C.

The District Court Employed An Erroneous
Legal Standard When It Held That Ambiguous
Conduct Will Not Justify An Investigative
Detention ..........................................................................................8

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..........................................................................................13

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016) ............................ 7
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)..................................................................... 9, 11
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) ..................................................................... 6
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) ........................................................................ 5
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) .................................................................... 5, 6
State v. Ashworth, 148 Idaho 700, 228 P.3d 381 (Ct. App. 2010) ................................. 4, 5
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009) .................................................... 11
State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 174 P.3d 876 (Ct. App. 2007) ............................................. 5
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 283 P.3d 722 (2012) ....................................................... 8
State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832, 186 P.3d 688 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................................ 5
State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295 (1987)................................................. 5, 6
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 294 P.3d 1121 (2013) ..................................................... 8
State v. Pachosa, 160 Idaho 35, 368 P.3d 655 (2016) ...................................................... 11
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004) .......................................................... 12
State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 181 P.3d 1231 (2008) ......................................................... 5
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 182 (2009) ....................................................... 7
State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 85 P.3d 1135 (Ct. App. 2004) ........................................ 5
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575 (2014) .......................................................... 4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ............................................................................ 8, 10, 11
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) .............................................................. 8, 10
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)..................................................................... 8

ii

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)................................................................... 5
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) ..................................................................... 8
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ............................................................ 10

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Michael Aaron Bonner with felony DUI, with a persistent
violator enhancement, and enhanced misdemeanor DWP. (R., pp. 27-28, 44-46.) Bonner
filed a motion to suppress, asserting an insufficient basis for the stop. (R., pp. 37-41.) The
state opposed the motion. (R., pp. 49-56.) The state contended that Bonner lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy because of a parole waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.
(R., pp. 51-52; see also State’s Exhibit 1, 2.) Bonner, as a parolee, consented to a “search
of [his] person” by “a law enforcement officer” and “waiv[ed his] rights under the Fourth
Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning searches.” (State’s Exhibit 1; see also
State’s Exhibit 2.) The state also argued that the encounter started consensually. (R., pp.
52-53.) Finally, it argued that the officer had reasonable suspicion, developing into
probable cause, for a detention. (R., pp. 54-56.)
The motion proceeded to hearing. (R., pp. 66-67; Tr.) The district court ultimately
found that Officer Linn noticed a Jetta at the Eagle Road exit from I-84 going faster than
the other traffic, although he could not have said how fast. (R., pp. 70-71.) It was during
the evening, and dark. (R., pp. 70, 72; see Defendant’s Exhibit A.) The Jetta also had a
temporary license in the back window, though Officer Linn could not see the dates on it.
(R., p. 71.) Officer Linn watched the driver pull off Eagle Road into an empty portion of
the hospital parking lot about 100 yards from the hospital. (R., p. 71.) Officer Linn
suspected the driver of the car was trying to evade him. (R., p. 71.) The driver exited the
1

car and approached a building other than the hospital, also about 100 yards from where the
Jetta parked. (R., p. 71.) The building was dark and both apparently and actually closed.
(R., p. 71.) This reinforced Officer Linn’s belief the driver was trying to avoid him. (R.,
p. 71.)
Officer Linn approached Bonner and asked, “What are you doing?” (R., p. 72.)
Bonner at some point claimed to be attempting to find his girlfriend and visit her
grandparents in the hospital. (R., p. 72.) Officer Linn asked for identification, which
Bonner provided. (R., p. 73.) Officer Linn asked about the Jetta and instructed Bonner to
sit down and to take his hands out of his pockets. (R., p. 73.) Officer Linn learned that
Bonner’s license was suspended and that he was on parole. (R., p. 73.) Testing showed
Bonner was under the influence of alcohol. (R., p. 73.)
The district court concluded that requesting identification was not a detention, but
that the instruction to sit was. (R., pp. 75-78.) The district court concluded that Officer
Linn lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Bonner at that point. (R., pp. 77-80.) The
district court also concluded that Bonner had a reasonable expectation of privacy because
Officer Linn did not know of the parole waiver of Fourth Amendment rights at the time the
officer detained him. (R., pp. 80-81.) The district court granted the motion to suppress.
(R., p. 81.) The state filed a notice of appeal within 42 days of the filing of the order
granting suppression. (R., pp. 84-86.)

2

ISSUES
1.
Did the district court err by concluding that Bonner retained a privacy right despite
his waiver?
2.
If Bonner retained a privacy right, did the officer have reasonable suspicion to
detain him?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Bonner Showed No Privacy Right Infringed Upon By His Detention
A.

Introduction
In granting the suppression motion, the district court reasoned that Bonner had a

privacy right because the parole waiver of his Fourth amendment rights was “ineffective”
because “Officer Linn did not know that Mr. Bonner had waived his Fourth Amendment
rights.” (R., p. 80.) The district court erred because Officer Linn’s knowledge was
irrelevant to the question of whether Bonner had a reasonable expectation of privacy that
society was willing to recognize as reasonable.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews suppression motion orders with a bifurcated standard. State v.

Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014). When a decision on a motion to
suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are
not clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those
facts. Id.

C.

The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard
Constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures “apply only

to a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy—one which the party subjectively held and
which society is willing to recognize as reasonable.” State v. Ashworth, 148 Idaho 700,
702, 228 P.3d 381, 383 (Ct. App. 2010). “A person challenging a search has the burden of
showing that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place
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searched.” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008) (citing
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)).
Whether protections against unreasonable searches and seizures apply “involves a
two-part inquiry: (1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object
of the challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable?” Id. at 626, 181 P.3d at 1234. See
also ------Ashworth, 148 Idaho at 702, 228 P.3d
- --at 383 (“Therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis involves a determination of whether the
defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the
defendant’s expectation of privacy, when viewed objectively, was reasonable under the
circumstances.”); State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832, 837, 186 P.3d 688, 693 (Ct. App. 2008)
(“An expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable when it is legitimate, justifiable, and
one society should both recognize and protect.”). “The burden is on the defendant to prove
the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy.” State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 739,
85 P.3d 1135, 1138 (Ct. App. 2004).
“Idaho appellate courts have long-recognized that parolees and probationers have
a diminished expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth Amendment waivers as a
condition of parole or probation.” State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876, 878
(Ct. App. 2007). See
also -------------Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v.
- --Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). “[P]ersons conditionally released to societies have a
reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities
‘reasonable’ which otherwise would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional
constitutional concepts.” State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297

5

(1987). Thus, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting
a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 856.
The district court did not apply these standards. (R., pp. 80-81.) It held that “Mr.
Bonner’s waiver is ineffective as to this seizure because the [sic] Officer Linn did not know
of the waiver or know or reasonably believe that Mr. Bonner was a parolee or probationer
at the time of the seizure.” (R., p. 81.) As noted above, the proper test is whether Bonner
had a subjective expectation of privacy, and whether society would recognize that
expectation as reasonable.

Notably absent from this standard is any third party’s

knowledge of Bonner’s privacy interests. Officer Linn’s ignorance of Bonner’s parole
status did not, and cannot, confer upon Bonner an expectation of privacy he did not possess.
“[T]he touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question whether
a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (internal quotation omitted). Bonner’s waiver of
his Fourth Amendment rights extinguished his expectation of privacy. Gawron, 112 Idaho
at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297. The Supreme Court of the United States has held, “the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a
parolee.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 857. The district court’s holding that the officer’s ignorance
of Bonner’s parole status and waiver somehow restored Bonner’s privacy expectation to
the same as a non-parolee who had not waived his Fourth Amendment rights is without
legal basis. The district court erred by adding a requirement of officer knowledge to the
expectation of privacy inquiry.
Nor did the district court reach the correct result by an erroneous analysis. As a
condition of release on parole, Bonner “consent[ed] to the search of [his] person” and
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waived his constitutional rights “concerning searches.” (State’s Exhibit 1.) BAC testing
is a search of Bonner’s person. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173, 195 L.
Ed. 2d 560 (2016) (“our cases establish that the taking of a blood sample or the
administration of a breath test is a search”). Because Bonner had waived his privacy
expectation against BAC searches, Officer Linn did not violate his rights by detaining him
or having such a search conducted. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 210, 207 P.3d 182,
186 (2009).
Bonner failed to establish that he had an expectation of privacy infringed by his
detention and BAC testing. He therefore failed to show that any of the evidence the state
acquired in this case was subject to suppression. The district court’s analysis—that the
evidence should be suppressed because Bonner had a privacy expectation unless Officer
Linn knew that he did not—is without legal or logical basis. Because Bonner’s rights were
not violated, he was not entitled to suppression. The district court erred and should be
reversed.

II.
Officer Linn Had Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Bonner
A.

Introduction
Even if Officer Linn’s unawareness of Bonner’s parole status conferred upon

Bonner a privacy interest against being detained and submitting to BAC testing, Officer
Linn did not act in a constitutionally unreasonable manner when he detained Bonner
because he had reasonable suspicion. The district court reasoned that Officer Linn “knew
that Mr. Bonner was not running away from him” because Bonner explained that he was
trying to visit his girlfriend’s grandparents in the hospital.
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(R., p. 78.)

Bonner’s

explanation for his actions did not dispel reasonable suspicion that Bonner was deliberately
trying to evade Officer Linn.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.” State v. Morgan,

154 Idaho 109, 111, 294 P.3d 1121, 1123 (2013). “On review of a suppression motion
ruling, this Court will accept the district court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410, 283 P.3d 722, 727 (2012).

C.

The District Court Employed An Erroneous Legal Standard When It Held That
Ambiguous Conduct Will Not Justify An Investigative Detention
“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the

person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). “[T]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is
supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7 (1989)). The court must “look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see
whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal
wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18). “Although an officer’s reliance
on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need
not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying
a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968)). “The Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification
for making the stop.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. Furthermore, reasonable suspicion “need
not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. “[E]vasive
8

behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
Officer Linn believed Bonner was intentionally evading him because: 1) Bonner
drove by him on a freeway off-ramp “too fast for the amount of roadway left to actually
make a stop” if the traffic light did not cycle to green or if anything else unexpected
happened (Tr., p. 41, L. 5 – p. 42, L. 5; p. 58, L. 25 – p. 59, L. 11; p. 64, L. 17 – p. 67, L.
23; p. 70, L. 24 – p. 72, L. 1); 2) Bonner was “looking around” as he drove (Tr., p. 42, L.
23 – p. 43, L. 7; p. 46, Ls. 10-16); 3) the car had a temporary registration, which Officer
Linn could not determine was valid (Tr., p. 42, Ls. 16-22; p. 62, Ls. 7-24); 4) Bonner
“moved lanes from where we were at all the way to the right lane” and turned into the St.
Luke’s hospital complex (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 1-4; p. 46, Ls. 10-16; p. 68, L. 3 – p. 69, L. 8); 5)
Bonner pulled into the parking lot and parked “a distance away” from an outpatient surgery
building, and “even further away from the hospital itself,” even though there were spots
“close to the building” because “there were no other vehicles in the parking lot” (Tr., p. 43,
L. 8 – p. 44, L. 3; p. 69, L. 10 – p. 70, L. 15); 6) the outpatient surgery center appeared
closed because of the lack of cars in the parking lot and the low light levels in the building
(Tr., p. 44, Ls. 4-14); 7) Bonner approached the outpatient surgery building and tried, but
failed, to get in (Tr., p. 46, L. 17 – p. 47, L. 2); 8) Bonner then walked away, in a direction
away from both the building and his car (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 7-16); and 9) when Officer Linn
asked whether the car he had seen was Bonner’s, Bonner did not respond (Tr., p. 50, L. 24
– p. 51, L. 17). This behavior, based on his training and experience, aroused Officer Linn’s
suspicion that “more was going on” and that Bonner may have been trying to evade
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detection of an unregistered or stolen car. (Tr., p. 47, L. 17 – p. 48, L. 15; p. 72, L. 2 – p.
73, L. 8.)
The totality of the circumstances supports Officer Linn’s belief that Bonner was
attempting to evade him, and may have been doing so to avoid detection of a crime such
as possession of a stolen car or a registration violation. Bonner drove unusually fast under
the circumstances; was looking around for the officer when he changed lanes more than
once to make what appeared to be an unplanned exit from Eagle Road into the St. Luke’s
complex; parked well away from the buildings and approached what appeared to be (and
proved in fact) a closed business; and then walked away from both the car and the area of
the complex where the hospital was located. To top it off, Bonner did not respond when
asked about whether the car the officer had seen was Bonner’s. Applying the correct legal
standards to the totality of the circumstances shows Officer Linn had reasonable suspicion
justifying a temporary investigative detention of Bonner to ascertain whether Bonner was
trying to avoid detection of a crime involving Bonner or his car.
In deciding otherwise, the district court erred as a matter of law when it applied a
standard of avoiding “an analysis whereby ‘a vague suspicion could be transformed into
probable cause for arrest by reasons of ambiguous conduct.’” (R., p. 80 (quoting Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). While that may be an appropriate standard
for evaluating probable cause to arrest, it is wrongly applied in the investigative detention
context. To the contrary, in the investigative detention context ambiguous conduct can
give rise to reasonable suspicion. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (reasonable suspicion for an
investigative stop “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct”).

Indeed,

ambiguous conduct was what justified the stop in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968)
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(officer saw two men conferring on a street corner, then take turns walking up the street to
a store 300 to 400 feet away and looking in a window before returning to the corner,
something that both men did five or six times). In addressing Terry the Court later stated:
Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and
susceptible of an innocent explanation. The officer observed two
individuals pacing back and forth in front of a store, peering into the
window and periodically conferring. All of this conduct was by itself
lawful, but it also suggested that the individuals were casing the store for a
planned robbery. Terry recognized that the officers could detain the
individuals to resolve the ambiguity.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added, citations omitted). The court erred when it
held that ambiguous conduct would not create reasonable suspicion.
Likewise, Bonner’s behavior was not merely “unusual,” nor rendered suspicionless
by facts such as his decision to not run when confronted. (R., pp. 78-80.) Officer Linn
reasonably believed that Bonner’s conduct in driving unusually fast away from him,
checking to see where he was, moving across two lanes of traffic to duck into a mostly
empty parking lot, and then trying to walk away from his car was an attempt to evade police
contact and disassociate himself from the car. Attempting to evade police contact is not
merely unusual, it is suspicious. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (2000) (“evasive behavior is a
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion”). The district court erred by ignoring
or excusing it.
Nor is the district court’s analysis supported by the cases it cited. (R., pp. 77-80.)
In State v. Pachosa, 160 Idaho 35, 39, 368 P.3d 655, 659 (2016), the Court found reasonable
suspicion to detain Pachosa for giving a false name when the name she gave officers did
not return from a driver’s license database when it should have. In State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 811-15, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210-14 (2009), a “hearsay upon hearsay” tip that
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Bishop attempted to sell methamphetamine to carnival workers provided reasonable
suspicion to stop him. The facts found insufficient to justify an investigative detention in
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 842, 103 P.3d 454, 455 (2004), were as follows:
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on March 1, 2003, Post Falls City police officer
David Marshall was on patrol when he observed the defendant Arnold Page
walking down the middle of a roadway carrying some bags. There were no
vehicles on the roadway and the street was located in a residential area that
lacked sidewalks.
Obviously Page was not trying to evade police by walking down the middle of a road at
2:00 a.m. In contrast, the evidence suggesting that Bonner was attempting to evade police,
perhaps to avoid detection of an expired registration or association with a stolen car, is
much stronger. That Bonner’s behavior was “unusual” did not shield him from an
investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion.
The district court employed an incorrect legal standard whereby Bonner’s unusual
conduct had to be more than “ambiguous” as to its suggestion of criminal activity.
Although ambiguous, and perhaps innocent (although subsequent events proved otherwise,
albeit Bonner was attempting to avoid detection for DUI), Bonner’s attempts to evade
police contact under the totality of the circumstances of this case justified a limited
detention to investigate a possible registration violation or the possibility of a stolen car.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
granting suppression of evidence.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming
for KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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